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ABSTRACT
Following the enactment of the Labour Law in 1995, China’s
urban labour market witnessed a divergence in both gender
wage gap and discrimination against female workers before 2007,
and thereafter a convergence in both. Contributions of endow-
ment differentials between male and female workers to wage gap
were diminishing because of the consistent improvement in the
female workers’ endowments. Discrimination against women, on
the other hand, kept increasing and exceeded that of endowment
differentials and eventually became the dominating contributor
by 2002. Driven by the optimisation of female workers’ endow-
ments, the execution of new labour market legislation, the trans-
formation of previously limitless labour supply into shortage, as
well as the reform of income distribution policies, a long-term
trend of convergence in both gender wage gap and discrimin-
ation has been forming. China has been striding forward into a
society with more equity and justice ever since 2007.
ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 31 October 2018








Since the reform and opening up in 1978, the average economic growth rate in main-
land China from 1980 to 2010 was about 9.75%, 9.99%, 10.29%, and 11.31%, much
higher than the world average economic growth rate during the same period.
However, at the same time of rapid development, problems such as uneven urban
and rural development and differences in labour wages have also arisen (Chen, Lin,
Chou, & Chen, 2018). China’s labour market has seen a series of profound changes
since the mid-1990s. In 1992, a new reform agenda was ratified by the 14th Congress
of the Chinese Communist Party, which proclaimed that one of the reform goals was
to establish a ‘socialist market economy’. From 1992 to 1993, state-owned enterprises
CONTACT Li-Chen Chou edcv2581013@gmail.com
 2019 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is
properly cited.
ECONOMIC RESEARCH-EKONOMSKA ISTRAZIVANJA
2019, VOL. 32, NO. 1, 3162–3182
https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677X.2019.1660906
initiated their employment reforms. Firms were given more autonomy and discretion
in setting wages and bonuses and also in decision-making regarding recruitment, lay-
offs, and termination of the contract. Workers, too, were given more freedom to
negotiate with employers regarding rewards and work conditions, and even choose
employers they would work for. In 1994, the Labour Law was passed and became
effective in 1995; it further increased the flexibility of labour allocation and also
brought the labour market construction into a legal track. In 1998, the Ministry of
Labour was renamed as the Ministry of Labour and Social Security to administrate
social insurance and related affairs for all workers associated with different kinds of
enterprise. In December the same year, Regulations on Unemployment Insurance was
promulgated by the State Council. In 1997, state-owned enterprises launched a new
wave of labour market reforms with the purpose of reducing inefficiency leading to
25.533 million workers being laid off in the following four years, which accounted for
23.7%1 of the total number of employees in state-owned enterprises in 1997. In 2004,
a segmental labour supply shortage, Min Gong Huang, occurred in Dongguan and a
few other coastal cities, which developed into a comprehensive shortage across the
nation until 2010. In 2007, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress
passed the New Labour Contract Act that specified in detail both employer and
employee behaviours in the making, changing and terminating of contracts. In 2012,
the 18th National Congress of CPC decided to deepen income distribution system
reforms so that everybody could share in the fruits of development. In 2013, the State
Council issued the Several Opinions on Deepening Income Distribution Reform,
which declared narrowing of the income gap as one of the four main reforming goals.
In 2014, the State Council published the Opinions on Carrying on the Reform of
Household Registration System, which kicked off reforms in the Hukou System.
Millions of migrant workers started to settle in towns, cities and metropolitan areas
where they had been working for many years. China’s segmented labour market
started to move toward integration. Market-oriented reform in the employment sys-
tem, with its goal of establishing an orderly, flexible, and effective labour market
mechanism, was one of the most important moves in China’s economic transition.
The reform has undoubtedly been successful in both boosting market vitality and
improving economic efficiency. However, researchers note that it has also degenerated
the gender inequality in the urban labour market and it is becoming more and more
difficult for women to be employed (He, Liu, & Xu, 2016; Jiang, 2007; Yao & Xie,
2006). Additionally, the ratio of female to male earnings has consistently been falling.2
What accounts for the increasing gender wage differential and the dramatic
changes in China’s labour market over the past two decades? How have human
capital and discrimination factors changed, and to what extent do they contribute to
the gender wage gap? Is discrimination against female workers mainly stemming
from wage discrimination internally or employment discrimination externally?
Understanding these questions not only helps us to accurately address issues of wom-
en’s basic rights and economic efficiency, but it also provides a framework e to
explain, evaluate and design the ongoing reforms in the labour market.
The purpose of this paper is to explore the trends in gender wage differentials in
the Chinese labour market between 1995 and 2013. The study applies CHIP’s (China
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Household Income Project) data from 1995 to 2013 to document changes in gender
wage gap and discrimination against women in the urban labour market, and to ana-
lyse the dynamics behind these changes. The contribution of this paper is mainly
reflected in the following two parts. First, it uses 18 years of data to analyse wage dif-
ferential and discrimination based on four distinct cross-sectional data. This allows
for the ability to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the gender wage gap and
discrimination, and the possibility to predict the trends compared to other research
on the same topic that uses data only from either one point (Ning, 2011; Zhao, 2014)
or two periods (Zhang & Guo, 2012) of time. Secondly, the paper also utilises the
maximum likelihood estimation of Heckman’s sample selection model to control for
the sample selection bias caused by the omission of unemployed individuals. We also
use a modified Appleton decomposition methodology to manage the dual index num-
ber problem, thereby improving the accuracy of the results. Our research indicates
that China’s urban labour market witnessed a divergence initially followed by conver-
gence in both the gender wage gap and discrimination against female workers. A
long-term trend of convergence in both the gender wage gap and discrimination has
been forming. China has been striding forward into a society characterised by more
equity and justice since 2007.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a literature
review on gender wage gap and discrimination. Section 3 overviews the methodology
we utilised to conduct the analysis in this paper. Section 4 is the statistical description
of data used in the paper. Section 5 breaks down the gender wage gap for each of the
four datasets from 1995, 2002, 2007, and 2013 based on regressions. Section 6
presents and compares the results of the decomposition. The final section draws con-
clusions, and also discusses the limitations of the study and areas for future research
and improvement.
2. Literature review
Economic transition and market-oriented reforms may have a multi-dimensional
effect on gender wage gap. First, the market-oriented reforms in the allocation of
labour may weaken occupational segregation such that women move from ‘over-
crowded’ ‘female occupations’ to ‘male occupations’, which would induce an
increase in women’s wages and narrow the gender wage gap accordingly. Secondly,
increase in women’s educational attainment and labour participation rate will result
in narrowing of the gender wage gap in two ways, namely, improvement in wom-
en’s endowments, and decrease in statistical discrimination, which is assumed to be
originating from the anticipation of differences in gender average productivity (Yip
& Wong, 2014). Thirdly, socio-cultural changes generally benefit women immensely,
improving their social status, enhancing their professional identity, and most
importantly narrowing the gender wage gap by weakening the employer, customer
and peer-worker’s discriminating preference against women (Becker, 1985).
However, things may also go in the opposite direction. Women may lose the protec-
tion of the government’s equal employment policy during the process of marketisa-
tion. Women tend to choose occupations with lesser requirement of technical skills
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and knowledge, and therefore accept lower pay in order to maintain an appropriate
balance between work and life. This evidently results in lower wages for women
relative to their male counterparts (Brainerd, 2000). Economic structure, changes in
income, law enforcement and other unobserved factors may also impact gender
wage gap (Blau & Kahn, 1999), which is why the magnitudes, trends and causes of
gender wage differential differ from nation to nation, development-phase to devel-
opment-phase in the same country, and even state to state within the same nation
during the same time-period. Gender wage gap is more likely an empirical rather
than a theoretical issue.
Trends in gender wage gap and discrimination in Eastern European countries and
the former Soviet Union have moved in opposite directions during a similar process
of economic transition from planned to market economy in both regions. The post-
transition female to male wage ratio decreased in Ukraine and Russia because of wid-
ening wage distribution, but increased in Eastern European countries because of
reduced discrimination, rising returns to education and also the fact that women in
those countries were better educated and trained (Brainerd, 2000). Elena and Mroz
(2000) found that gender inequality declined significantly in the lowest percentiles of
the Russian distribution, increased in the upper percentiles, and was stable in the
interquartile range. The net effect was a relatively small change in gender inequality,
on average, between 1992 and 1995. A research conducted by Jolliffe and Campos
(2005) indicated that the male-female differences in log wages declined from 0.31 to
0.19 between 1986 and 1998, which is largely explained by a matching decline in
Oaxaca’s discrimination.
In Southeast Asian countries, trends and causes of gender wage differentials vary.
Deshpande, Goel, and Khanna (2018) used nationally representative data from the
Employment-Unemployment Surveys in 1990–2000 and 2009–2010 to explore gender
wage gaps among regular wage workers in India. They found that the wage ratio of
women to men decreased from 55% in 1999–2000 to 49% in 2009–2010, and the bulk
of the gender wage gap was unexplained. They also found that over the decade, while
the wage-earning characteristics of women improved relative to men, the discrimin-
atory component of the gender wage gap increased. If women were ‘paid like men’ in
2009–2010, they would have earned more than men on account of the improvement
in their wage-earning characteristics. Ahmed and McGillivray (2015) investigated
changes in the gender wage gap in Bangladesh over the period 1999–2009 and found
that the gap in average wages between men and women decreased by 31% over this
period. The key driver of this change was an improvement in female educational
qualifications. They also found that the gender wage gap narrowed much more at the
lower end of the wage distribution, which is attributed largely to a decline in discrim-
ination against women.
The gender wage gap and the level of discrimination in the United States consist-
ently decreased at the federal level, with wide variations across different states over
the past 30 years. Suh (2010) studied the determinants and characteristics of changes
in gender wage gap in the United States between 1989 and 2005 and found that the
wage ratio of women to men increased from 74.0% to 80.4% during the period
studied. He attributed this change mainly to the increase in women’s experience,
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work hours, and education. A diminishing level of discrimination in the labour market
also played an important role. Balance (2012) reported that the gender wage gap in the
United States fell from 0.4357 log points over the period of 1980–1984 to 0.2673 log
points over the period of 2005–2010 at the federal level. The narrowing of the gender
wage gap was mainly attributable to a reduction in the level of gender discrimination.
Balance’s estimation at the state level also showed a significant decrease in gender wage
gap over the period 1980–2010. However, there were wide variations observed in gen-
der wage gap and level of discrimination across the US states. In other related studies,
Hofer, Titelbach, Winter-Ebmer, and Ahammer (2017) analysed wage discrimination
against immigrants in Austria using combined information from the labour force sur-
veys and administrative social security data. The empirical results indicated that immi-
grants experience a wage penalty of 15 percentage points compared with natives. Blau
and Kahn (2000, 2017) concluded that the limitation of wage regressions is that the
coefficient on the gender variable could capture intrinsic differences between men and
women rather than the effects of gender discrimination. If male workers perform better
in ways that are unobservable to the researcher, a wage regression will overestimate the
extent of discrimination against women. Alternatively, discrimination is underestimated
if the control variables in wage regressions are themselves affected by discrimination.
Bernal, Vasquez, and Edwards (2018) tested whether there was a significant salary dif-
ference between women and men working as faculty in Marriage and Family Therapy
(MFT) programmes within public universities. The main results indicated no evidence
of salary discrimination against women working as MFT faculty members but showed
that women were shown to have significantly less time in academia and to publish sig-
nificantly fewer peer-reviewed journal articles than men.
Gender wage gap and discrimination in China received attention from the aca-
demic community in the late 1990s, and literature on this topic saw a substantial
increase after 2000. Dong and Zhang (2009) employed firm-level data to analyse gen-
der wage differentials in Chinese industries in the late 1990s and concluded that
employers’ discrimination against women was not a significant source of the gender
wage gap. Instead, they found that the relative wage of unskilled female to male
workers was higher than their relative productivity, which consequently accounted for
a disproportionate share of the labour surplus in state-owned enterprises. Huang
(2010) used the data from Survey on Temporary Residents in Cities 2002 conducted
by The Institute of Economics of the Academy of China’s Social Science to explore
the gender wage gap among migrant workers. He found that 80.7% of the gender
wage gap was attributable to discrimination and only 19.3% was attributable to differ-
ences in human capital endowment. Peng (2010) utilised CGSS 2006 data and Brown
methodology to examine the rates of return to education among the highly educated
and gender wage disparities. He found that discrimination was the main reason for
the gender wage gap, while human capital differentials explained only one fourth of
the wage gap. Magnani and Zhu (2012) employed the migrant population data from
CHIP 2002 to analyse gender wage differentials among migrants in China. They
found that male migrants earned 30.2% higher hourly wages than female migrants.
Discrimination effects contributed more to the wage gap than endowment effects
throughout the wage distribution. They also ascertained that the relative gender wage
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discrimination problem was most serious among low income migrants. Chen et al.
adopted enterprise level dataset to identify the link between globalisation and gender
inequality in China’s labour market, and found that the large gender wage gap in for-
eign and exporting firms was mainly caused by differences in gender productivity.
They also found that gender wage discrimination was observed only among private
non-exporting firms. Qing and Zheng (2013) analysed the data of CGSS 2006 to study
the effects of hierarchical segregation on gender wage disparity. They concluded that
41% of the total gender log hourly earnings differentials were observed across job lev-
els. Much of the unexplained differences accounted for wage discrimination within job
levels, and a quarter of the total gap was attributable to gender discrimination in job
promotion. Chen and Zhou (2014) studied the effects of occupation choice on gender
discrimination. Although there are large differences in these studies with respect to
their objectives and the decomposition methodology employed in them, each of them
similarly focus on an analysis at one point of time and do not engage in evolvement
of gender wage gap and discrimination over a long period of time.
Two studies are closely related to our research. Zhang, Han, Liu, and Zhao (2008) used
urban household survey data to analyse changes in gender wage gap in urban China over
the period1988–2004. They found that the mean female to male wage ratio declined from
86.3% to 76.2%, rapid increases in returns to both observed and unobserved skills mainly
being responsible for this diverging trend. Increased discrimination served to widen the
gender wage gap as well. Since the data they used ranged from 1988 to 2004, their results
cannot accurately reflect the dynamics in gender wage gap in China’s labour market after
that time-period. Zhang and Guo (2012) employed CHIPS data to decompose the changes
in gender wage gap in urban China’s labour market over the period 1995–2002, and deter-
mined that the gender wage gap increased during that period, which was completely attrib-
utable to gender discrimination. Since their paper focused on the effects of professional
segregation on gender wage differential and analysed two cross-sectional datasets in a short
time-period, their study does not reveal the trends and causes of changes in gender wage
gap and discrimination over long time-periods. However, the government of China has,
over time, launched a series of profound reforms in the urban labour market. Furthermore,
there is a significant flaw in Brown methodology. It uses male workers’ wage structure as
the non-discrimination wage structure and male employment probability as the non-dis-
crimination employment probability to break down gender wage gap. This leads to the
problem of ‘dual index number’, and therefore the results of decomposition are unstable.
3. Models and methodology
A standard method to decompose wage differential is to estimate the expanded
Mincer equation where the natural logarithm of hourly wage is regressed against
human capital variables, individual characteristic variables, family background varia-
bles, and structure variables. Consider the following:
ln wið Þ ¼ Xibi þ ei (1)
where i ¼ 1, 0; 1 representing male and 0 representing female, wi is vector for
hourly wage, Xi is the matrix of predictors, bi is the vector of parameters, and ei is
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the vector of regression disturbances. The variables used in the wage equation are
listed below.
Individuals who are in the labour force but are not employed have been omitted
from the sample because they do not have any wage information. Therefore, OLS
estimates for Equation (1) yield a sample selection bias and hence violate the require-
ment of Gauss Markov assumption, which states the expected value of the error term
must be equal to zero (Heckman, 1979). To account for this bias, we apply the max-
imum likelihood estimation of Heckman’s sample selection model to translate the
sample selection bias into an omitted variable bias which can then be corrected for
by estimating an Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR). IMR is estimated using a logistic model
that assumes a value of 1 if the person has an observed wage and 0 if the person
does not have wage information but is still in the labour force. If we assume that
each person has a reservation wage for which he or she will accept a job, we can




where i ¼ 1, 0; representing male and female, respectively, pi is the probability of
accepting a job, Xi is the vector of explained variables, and Zi is the vector of parame-
ters. Three factors, namely, education, experience, and region are included in
Equation (2), defined in the same way as in Table 1. Based on the estimation of
Equation (2), IMR is calculated as follows:
IMRi ¼ u XiZið Þ; XiZið Þ (3)
where uðXiZiÞ is the density function, and ;ðXiZiÞ is the distribution function.
The IMR, then, is added to the wage equation as an additional explanatory vari-
able. The amended equation is:
ln wið Þ ¼ Xibi þ IMRici þ ei (4)
where ci is the coefficient vector for IMRi. A statistically significant coefficient indi-
cates that there are sample selection issues which would bias the estimation if IMRi is
not included.
After regressing male wage and female wage equations according to Equation (1),
Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) proposed that the mean wage gap should be sepa-
rated into two components, the explained and unexplained components. The decom-
position equation is shown below:
ln wmð Þ  ln wfð Þ ¼ Xmbm  Xfbf ¼ XmXfð Þbm þ bmbf
 
Xf (5)
The term ln wmð Þ  ln wfð Þ is the mean logarithm of wage differentials between
male and female workers. Xm and Xf are the vectors of explanatory variables eval-
uated at the mean for each gender. bm and bf are the vectors of the regression
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coefficient to male wage equation and female wage equation, respectively, which we
also refer to as the wage structure. The term XmXfð Þbm, which measures the dif-
ferential due to differences in predictors, is considered to be a justifiable proportion
of the wage disparity. The term bmbf
 
Xf measures the difference in the coefficients
between men and women, which indicates discrimination against women.
It is important to note that by the Oaxaca–Blinder method, both the male wage
structure, bm, and the female wage structure, bf , are equally employable as the
decomposition benchmark. The results of decomposition by the Oaxaca–Blinder
method are, therefore, unstable. This is the so-called ‘index number problem’. To
deal with this problem, Neumark (1988) suggested taking the matrix of the regression
coefficients to a pooled sample of male and female workers as the non-discriminatory
wage structure. Neumark decomposition methodology is shown below:
ln wmð Þ  ln wfð Þ ¼ XmXfð Þbþ bmbð ÞXm þ bbf
 
Xf (6)
where b is the vector of regression coefficients to the pooled sample of male and
female workers that represents the non-discriminatory wage structure, XmXfð Þb
captures the difference in endowments between men and women, bmbð ÞXm denotes
Table 1. Wage equation variables.
Name Definition
Natural Logarithm of Hourly Wage ¼ln{(E/MDH)}, where E¼ annual earnings calculated at prices of 2013,
M¼ average months worked in the past year, D¼ average days worked
per month and H¼ average hours worked per day
Education ¼years of formal education received
Experience ¼years employed
Experience 2 ¼experience squared
Sex ¼1 if male, ¼0 if female
marriage ¼1 if respondent is first-married, remarried, divorced, widowed, ¼0 if
cohabiting and never married
Ownership (collective enterprises as the benchmark)
State-owned ¼1 if respondent works for solely state owned/state holding enterprises,
Sino-foreign joint venture/solely foreign owned enterprises, ¼0 otherwise
Private ¼1, if respondent works in government and party agencies, public institution,
individual enterprises, private enterprises, ¼0 otherwise
Industry (agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery as the benchmark)
Finance ¼1 if respondent works in financial industry; information transmission,
software and information technology services; scientific research and
technical services, ¼0 otherwise
Manufacturing ¼1 if respondent works in mining; manufacturing; production and supply of
electricity, gas and water; construction;/wholesale and retail trades;
transportation, storage and post, accommodation and catering services; real
estate; leasing and business services; management of water conservancy;
environment and public facilities; residential services, repairing and other
services; education; health and social work; culture, sports and
entertainment; public management, social securities and social
organizations; international organizations, ¼0 otherwise
Administrator ¼1 if the occupation is professional; manager; director of government agent,
institution and enterprise; department director of government agent,
institution and enterprise; ¼0 otherwise
Region (the western region as the benchmark)
East ¼1 if works in Beijing, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Shandong, Guangdong,
¼0 otherwise
Central ¼1 if works in Shanxi, Anhui, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, ¼0 otherwise
Note: There is a slight difference in the classification criteria by industry, occupation and ownership in each of the four
years. We have assigned values to all related variables in this paper according to the definitions above uniformly.
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a treatment advantage to men, and bbf
 
Xf denotes a treatment disadvantage to
women. The last two items of the equation together account for the discrimination
against women.
However, Neumark’s decomposition may enlarge the wage discrimination by fail-
ing to consider the difference in employment probability between men and women.
Appleton improved Neumark’s method by overcoming this flaw and proposing the
following decomposition equation:
pMAln wmð Þ  pFAln wfð Þ ¼ pN XmXfð Þbþ pN bmbð ÞXm
þ pN bbf
 
Xf þ pMNpNð Þln wmð Þ þ pNpFNð Þln wfð Þ
þ pMApMNð Þln wmð Þ þ pFNpFAð Þln wfð Þ
(7)
where pMA is the actual employment probability of men, pFA is the actual employ-
ment probability of women, pN is the non-discriminatory employment probability of
the entire labour force, pMN is the non-discriminatory employment probability of
men, and pFN is the non-discriminatory employment probability of women. To keep
it simple, we set I¼pN XmXfð Þb, II ¼pN bmbð ÞXm, III¼ pN bbf
 
Xf , IV ¼
pMNpNð Þln wmð Þ, V ¼ pNpFNð Þln wfð Þ, VI¼ pMApMNð Þln wmð Þ, and VII ¼
pFNpFAð Þln wfð Þ. Iþ IVþV, then, captures the component caused by gender endow-
ments differentials; IIþ IIIþVIþVII captures discrimination against women; IIþ III
is the portion stemming from different returns to endowments between men and
women; and VIþVII is the portion attributable to the discriminatory employment
probability.
4. Data and descriptive statistics
Given the objectives we want to achieve, the data set used in this analysis must ‹
cover enough time span to include all the important events that happened in the ref-
ormation of China’s labour market system, › have an appropriate interval between
each cross-section to reflect the prospective changes, both in wage gap and discrimin-
ation, fi contain a large enough sample to secure an unbiased analysis to subsamples
and all human capital variables, individual characteristic variables, and other struc-
tural variables in both employment and wage equations. China Household Income
Project (CHIP) meets all our requirements above and has been chosen as the data
source for the analysis in this paper. CHIP was initiated by the Institute of China’s
Income Distribution, Beijing Normal University in 1988, and up to 2013 five cross-
sectional datasets were released. The questionnaire in 1988 differs considerably from
the questionnaires of other years. Therefore, we chose only four sets of data from the
urban household survey in 1995, 2002, 2007, and 2013 in order to maintain
consistency.
Within each cross-sectional data, we excluded individuals aged below 16 years and
above 60 years, full-time homemakers, and re-employed retirees under the retirement
age to ensure the sample in question fell within the scope of the labour force. We
also excluded individuals who were employers or self-employed, as well as family-
workers to ensure that all the samples were wage earners. Moreover, samples with
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missing data were also excluded. After data-trimming, the data of 1995 consists of
11,347 labour-force samples and 10,906 employee samples from the provinces of
Beijing, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Guangdong, Shanxi, Anhui, Henan, Hubei, Sichuan,
Yunnan, and Gansu. The data of 2002 consists of 11,022 labour force samples and
9,556 employee samples from the 11 provinces above, and additionally from
Chongqing. The survey of 2007 has lesser data with 6731 labour force samples and
9,556 employee samples available. The survey of 2013 expanded to include a total of
14 provinces, with Shandong and Hunan as additions to the 12 provinces previously
included in 2002. A total of 8,813 labour force samples and 8,141 employee samples
are available in the survey of 2013.
Table 2 reports changes in the characteristics of job and human capital during the
18-year period from 1995 to 2013. The hourly log wage gender gap in the years of
1995, 2002, 2007 and 2013 are 0.138966, 0.170221, 0.25637, and 0.242546, respect-
ively. This suggests that the gender wage gap experienced a monotonic increase prior
to 2007 and a decreasing trend thereafter. Up until 2007, male workers’ human cap-
ital and job characteristics were superior to female workers, measured in terms of
education, experience, and employment in state-owned enterprises, the eastern
region, and finance industry, and employment as professionals or administrators.
However, women made significant improvements in narrowing the gap in almost all
the categories above during the period studied and exceeded men in 2013, with the
exception of experience and employment as professionals or administrators.
Impressively, women recorded a larger increase in educational attainment than men,
which resulted in a consistent narrowing of the gender gap from 0.59434 in 1995 to
–0.15683 in 2013. There were more women married than men during the period of
study, except in 2002. The number of women employed in manufacturing vis-a-vis
men fluctuated over the 18-year period. The gender gap in the category of employ-
ment in the central region has been positive and getting larger ever since 2007,
which implies more and more men are choosing to work in central China. The pro-
portion of women employed in private enterprises was lower than men before 2002,
but became higher after that year and an even larger increase was witnessed in the
following years.
Table 2. Changes in the characteristics of gender gap from 1995 and 2013.
Variables 1995 2002 2007 2013
Education 0.59434 0.09618 0.04252 –0.15683
Experience 2.87367 3.39505 3.20996 2.64891
Experience Squared 139.0371 153.5682 161.8337 132.3237
Marriage –0.011091 0.004052 –0.012249 –0.007899
Ownership (collective enterprise as the benchmark)
State-owned 0.072555 0.06614 0.038398 0.069577
Private 0.01316 0.007718 –0.02076 –0.051835
Industry (agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery as the benchmark)
Finance 0.001346 0.002114 0.00058 –0.004755
Manufacturing –0.012069 0.003452 –0.000852 0.000848
Administrator 0.093439 0.078363 0.081629 –0.016132
Region (western region as the benchmark)
East 0.001609 0.003293 0.010192 –0.012529
Central 0.009126 0.005019 0.004912 0.02493
Hourly log wage gap 0.138966 0.170221 0.25637 0.242546
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5. Regression and decomposition, a case of 20133
Table 3 reports the results of estimated coefficients and standard errors from the gen-
eral human capital model using the sample of males and females from 2013. Testing
for residual sequence indicates that there is no heteroscedasticity or autocorrelation,
and that the regression complies with basic econometric assumptions. P values for F-
statistics in the four specifications all equal zero, which signals that the models fit
well overall. As expected, all human capital and job characteristic variables in all the
four equations are significant factors of wage in 2013 with only an exception of
‘manufacturing’ in Equation (1) and ‘central region’ in Equations (2)–(4), which indi-
cates that the variable selection is reasonable.
Gender in Equation (1) is one of the significant factors of wage determination, its
coefficient being 0.236648. This means that men received substantially higher wages
than women, implying the possible gender discrimination in China’s labour market.
If other conditions had remained the same, men would have been paid more than
women by 23.6648% in 2013. Comparison coefficients in Equations (3) and (4) reveal
that the rate of return to experience, employment in finance industry and manufac-
turing, employment as professionals or administrators, and employment in the east-
ern region for men are positive and higher than women. This indicates a possible













Education 0.077333 0.096098 0.091695 0.098455
(0.003005) (0.002736) (0.003500) (0.004166)
Experience 0.026208 0.034270 0.041321 0.032007
(0.002982) (0.002975) (0.003932) (0.00452)
Experience Squared –0.000422 –0.000466 –0.000610 –0.000522
(0.000062) (0.000062) (0.000080) (0.000101)
Sex 0.236648
(0.015274)
Marriage 0.084995 0.073750 0.091995 0.098821
(0.030109) (0.030668) (0.040621) (0.045909)
Ownership (collective enterprise as the benchmark)
State-Owned 0.268500 0.335869 0.296457 0.329583
(0.026797) (0.027110) (0.035274) (0.041814)
Private 0.112997 0.168232 0.146046 0.1913
(0.023187) (0.023294) (0.031334) (0.033927)
Industry (agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery as the benchmark)
Finance 0.207975 0.759039 0.821142 0.686817
(0.071377) (0.051676) (0.065342) (0.078717)
Manufacturing 0.051057 0.610244 0.677965 0.514814
(0.065596) (0.042776) (0.053029) (0.065822)
Administrator 0.211658 0.181869 0.190176 0.172392
(0.018409) (0.018704) (0.024476) (0.028063)
Region (western region as the benchmark)
East 0.197423 0.219521 0.242885 0.205319
(0.019577) (0.019904) (0.026107) (0.029742)
Central –0.034170 0.001332 0.035225 –0.039994
(0.020290) (0.020558) (0.026723) (0.031087)
Adjusted R2 0.224706 0.189371 0.182069 0.203481
observation 8141 8141 4570 3571
Notes: Figures in parentheses are standard errors. ,  and  denote that the t-statistics are significant at 1%,
5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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discrimination against women in these factors. The rate of return to education, mar-
riage, employment in state-owned and private enterprises are positive but lower for
men than women, implying a possible reverse discrimination against men.
Table 4 lists the results of logistic regression from job obtainment equation for
overall labour force, male labour force, and female labour force, respectively, in
2013. The coefficient of gender in Equation (5) is 0.618140 with a level of signifi-
cance of 1%, which indicates that men find it easier than women to obtain a job in
the labour market. Comparison coefficients in Equations (7)–(8) indicate that educa-
tion, experience, marriage, and employment in the eastern region benefit the entire
labour force in job seeking; but experience, marriage, and employment in the eastern
region contribute more for men than women, while education contributes more for
women than men. The negative experience squared term indicates that experience
contributes to the increasing probability of job obtainment in a diminishing way.
Employment in the central region favours men but it is not a significant factor
for women.
Table 5 reports the results of regression without sample selection bias by employ-
ing Heckman two-step methodology. Note that the coefficients of IMRs in the four
equations are highly significant at 1%, indicating that there would be sample selec-
tion bias if IMRs were not added to the model. Compared to Table 3, we see
increase in the rates of return to experience, marriage, employment as professionals
or administrators, employment in the eastern and central regions; and marginal
decrease with varying magnitudes in rates of return to other factors in the male
wage equation. We also notice that the rates of return to education, experience, mar-
riage, employment as professionals or administrators, employment in the eastern
and central regions increase; and the rates of return to other factors decrease in the
female wage equation.











Constant –1.037640 –0.817190 –0.574348 –0.742539
(0.244925) (0.240405) (0.365238) (0.335461)
Education 0.120432 0.126554 0.093146 0.131191
(0.015388) (0.015235) (0.02337)7 (0.020907)
Experience 0.091480 0.096419 0.113061 0.083766
(0.014540) (0.014485) (0.022194) (0.019538)
Experience Squared –0.001849 –0.001841 –0.002237 –0.001790
(0.000281) (0.000280) (0.000421) (0.000389)
Sex 0.618140
(0.084150)
Marriage 0.818891 0.695406 1.034424 0.547917
(0.144780) (0.142707) (0.215760) (0.201964)
Region (western region as the benchmark)
East 0.693709 0.689933 0.772560 0.636105
(0.104724) (0.104264) (0.157847) (0.140059)
Central 0.309612 0.325016 0.527698 0.154716
(0.099713) (0.099226) (0.152148) (0.132619)
S.E. of regression 0.259802 0.260561 0.229169 0.292065
McFadden R-squared 0.073727 0.062178 0.084138 0.058026
Observation 8813 8813 4854 3571
Notes: Figures in parentheses are standard errors. ,  and  denote that the z-statistics are significant at 1%,
5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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We have used Equations (6) and (7) to decompose the gender wage gap and listed
the results in Tables 6–8. According to Table 6, endowment effects account for
8.0784% of the total gender wage differential, and price effects account for 91.9216%.
This means that 91.9216% of the wage disparity in 2013 stemmed from gender dis-
crimination against women.
The last column of Table 6 shows that discrimination against women is attrib-
utable to almost all human capital variables and job characteristics, except for
education, marriage, and employment in private enterprises. The price effect of
experience is notably high with a value of 0.296109, i.e., it solely accounts for
29.6109% of the total wage disparity. We also notice that not only was women’s
educational attainment more than men’s, but a reverse discrimination against
men resulting from education was also observed in 2013 albeit a minimal effect
of –0.069118.
Comparing Table 7 to Table 6, we find that the endowment effect falls from
8.0784% to 3.2669% and price effect rises from 91.9216% to 96.7331%, implying the
actual level of discrimination against women is higher after controlling for the sam-
ple selectivity bias. Total effects in the last column of Table 7 indicates that reverse
discrimination against men arising from differences in education falls from











Education 0.100686 0.106462 0.091425 0.112117
(0.002823) (0.002839) (0.003457) (0.004418)
Experience 0.045547 0.048205 0.055598 0.048886
(0.003118) (0.003158) (0.004103) (0.004884)
Experience Squared –0.00080 –0.000808 –0.000980 –0.001003
(0.000067) (0.000068) (0.000086) (0.000114)
Sex 0.235217
(0.015255)
Marriage 0.243825 0.229435 0.359608 0.207769
(0.032455) (0.032911) (0.047186) (0.047167)
Ownership (collective enterprise as the benchmark)
State-Owned 0.265317 0.293489 0.247129 0.285397
(0.026758) (0.027081) (0.035137) (0.041706)
Private 0.107079 0.113075 0.085403 0.130066
(0.023180) (0.023511) (0.031454) (0.034325)
Industry (agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery as the benchmark)
Finance 0.173675 0.150128 0.249355 0.051183
(0.070171) (0.071168) (0.083555) (0.107262)
Manufacturing 0.015474 –0.001633 0.102181 –0.122965
(0.064375) (0.065296) (0.074829) (0.098569)
Administrator 0.210092 0.202979 0.218128 0.197038
(0.018352) (0.018612) (0.024312) (0.027925)
Region (western region as the benchmark)
East 0.330998 0.343039 0.378726 0.332623
(0.021823) (0.022124) (0.028702) (0.032935)
Central 0.033530 0.045162 0.115616 –0.033343
(0.020397) (0.020678) (0.027427) (0.030782)
IMR 0.171499 0.188673 0.185396 0.238629
(0.015138) (0.015316) (0.017209) (0.027674)
R2 Squared 0.226842 0.204227 0.202378 0.219781
Observation 8141 8141 4570 3571
Notes: Figures in parentheses are standard errors. ,  and  denote that the t-statistics are significant at 1%,
5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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–0.096118 to –0.264531, but discrimination against women arising from all the other
factors increase.
Table 8 shows the decomposition results by taking into account the impact of
employment probability. It shows that the contribution of endowment differentials
decreases further from 3.2669% to (Iþ IVþV ¼) 2.1308864% and the contribution
of discrimination increases from 96.7331% to (IIþ IIIþVIþVII ¼) 97.8691136%, of
which 70.4780724% is attributable to wage discrimination and 27.3910412% to
employment discrimination against women.











Education –0.015071 –0.052547 –0.028499 –0.096118
Experience 0.09077815 0.1599798 0.0453506 0.296109
Experience Squared –0.0616628 –0.093291 0.0288699 –0.126084
Marriage –0.0005826 0.0160572 –0.022263 –0.006788
State-Owned 0.02336876 –0.010082 0.0011706 0.014458
Private –0.0087203 –0.01386 –0.015607 –0.038187
Finance –0.0036092 0.0046611 0.005764 0.006816
Manufacturing 0.00051749 0.0614823 0.0865578 0.148558
Administrator –0.0029339 0.0020922 0.0025398 0.001698
East –0.0027504 0.0099335 0.0062161 0.013399
Central 3.3207E–05 0.012111 0.0137368 0.025881
Total 0.01936733 0.0965366 0.1238367 0.239741
Value % of Total 0.080784 0.919216 1.000000











Education –0.0166964 –0.179458 –0.068376 –0.264531
Experience 0.12769071 0.1677394 –0.013647 0.281783
Experience Squared –0.1069175 –0.111431 0.1005291 –0.117820
Marriage –0.0018123 0.1145637 0.0192391 0.131991
State-Owned 0.02042008 –0.011859 0.0015069 0.010068
Private –0.0058612 –0.017287 –0.011495 –0.034644
Finance –0.0007139 0.0074475 0.0078968 0.014630
Manufacturing –1.385E–06 0.0942503 0.1100516 0.204301
Administrator –0.0032745 0.0038154 0.0015921 0.002133
East –0.0042979 0.0151728 0.004559 0.015434
Central 0.00112589 0.0251753 0.0260951 0.052396
Total 0.009662 0.108128 0.177951 0.295741
Value % of Total 0.032669 0.967331 1.000000










I 0.009041718 0.023801965 VII 0.052689344 0.138702616
II 0.101191819 0.266383467 Iþ IVþ V 0.008094657 0.021308864
III 0.16653517 0.438397257 IIþ IIIþ VIþ VII 0.37177809 0.978691136
IV –0.000447699 –0.001178551 IIþ III 0.26772699 0.704780724
V –0.000499362 –0.00131455 VIþ VII 0.104051101 0.273910412
VI 0.051361757 0.135207797 Iþ IIþ IIIþ IVþ
VþVIþ VII
0.379872747 1
Note: The meaning of roman alphabets I, II, III, IV, V, VI and VI are the same as what we defined in Section 3.
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6. Discussion
We list the decomposition results of 1995, 2002, 2007, and 2013 in Tables 9–11, and
their visual representations are presented in Figures 1–3. As shown in Table 9 and
Figure 1, the contribution of endowment differentials to the wage gap decreased
monotonically from 74.2388128% in 1995 to 8.0784494% in 2013. On the other hand,
the contribution of discrimination against women increased monotonically from
25.7611872% in 1995 to 91.9215506% in 2013, and the monotonicity remained even
when the gender wage gap started to decrease after 2007.
Table 10 and Figure 2 display the Neumark decomposition results with sample selectiv-
ity controls. We find that endowment difference alone comprised the gender wage gap in
1995 with a slight reverse discrimination against men, which may be connected to the
equal employment policy implemented by the state-owned enterprises and the govern-
ment’s increased emphasis on protection of women’s rights. During 1995–2007, the
Table 9. Neumark decomposition without sample selectivity controls, 1995–2013.
Endowment Difference % of Endowment Difference Discrimination % of Discrimination
0.10106069 0.742388128 0.035068492 0.257611872
0.09190604 0.536116931 0.079523054 0.463883069
0.06386896 0.249517879 0.192100502 0.750482121
0.01936733 0.080784494 0.220373317 0.919215506
Table 10. Neumark decomposition with sample selectivity controls, 1995–2013.
Year Endowment Difference % of Endowment Difference Discrimination % of Discrimination
1995 0.1355067 1.522348588 –0.046495076 –0.522348588
2002 0.0758832 0.394097887 0.116665943 0.605902113
2007 –0.055152 –0.113902215 0.539356927 1.113902215
2013 0.0096615 0.032668859 0.286079105 0.967331141
Table 11. Appleton decomposition,1995–2013.
Year Endowment Difference % of Endowment Difference Discrimination % of Discrimination
1995 0.1510853 1.02806795 –0.004124878 –0.02806795
2002 0.0673195 0.182641377 0.301268782 0.817358623
2007 –0.001062 –0.000965254 1.101044262 1.000965254
2013 0.0080947 0.021308864 0.37177809 0.978691136
Figure 1. Neumark decomposition without sample selectivity controls, 1995–2013.
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component of discrimination steadily increased and the component of endowment differ-
ence steadily decreased and became negative in 2007, which indicates that women on the
whole have exceeded men in terms of endowment characteristics and that the gender
wage gap is completely attributable to discrimination against women. During 2007–2013,
the contribution of endowment difference returned to positive (0.0096615), and the con-
tribution of discrimination fell marginally but remained as high as 96.7331141%.
Generally, discrimination against women has kept the same trend of change with gender
wage gap, increasing before 2007 and decreasing thereafter. Appleton decomposition
results, as shown in Table 11 and Figure 3, display the same trend of change in both wage
gap and discrimination against women as Neumark decomposition.
A further break-down of discrimination, as shown in Table 12 and Figure 4, indi-
cates that wage discrimination against men and employment discrimination against
women existed simultaneously in 1995, and that the absolute value of wage discrimin-
ation against men (–0.0453511) was slightly larger than employment discrimination
against women (0.04122619). From 1995 to 2007, employment discrimination and
Figure 2. Neumark decomposition with sample selectivity controls, 1995–2013.
Figure 3. Appleton decomposition, 1995–2013.
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wage discrimination against women increased at a constant rate with a higher level of
employment discrimination than wage discrimination over those years. These obser-
vations are consistent with both common sense and related research suggesting the
phenomenon of unequal pay for equal work occurs rarely, and that gender discrimin-
ation is most likely a result of industrial and occupational segregation (Li & Xie,
2015). After 2007, the contribution of wage discrimination increased, while the con-
tribution of employment decreased and eventually became lower than that of wage
discrimination.
It is worth discussing that if the marketisation reform in China’s labour market
deprived women of the government’s direct protection, incurring an increasingly
severe discrimination, what caused a decrease in employment discrimination, which
eventually fell lower than wage discrimination against women after 2007? Some fac-
tors may be responsible. First, the promulgation and implementation of the Labour
Contract Act. In June 2007, the Standing Committee of the National People’s
Congress passed the New Labour Contract Act of PRC, and in September 2008, the
State Council passed the Implementing Regulation on the New Labour Contract Act.
Although there are no specific anti-discrimination clauses in ether of the two legisla-
tions, both of them explicitly stipulated that employers must consult with the Union
and employee representatives on an equal basis when enacting, amending policies
regarding rewards, work hours, and other important matters relating to employees’
interests. The key point is that the New Labour Contract Act has been well enforced
and has induced strong responses from industries,4 objectively playing a critical role
in narrowing gender wage gap and eliminating discrimination against women.
Figure 4. Discrimination decomposition, 1995–2013.










1995 –0.0453511 –0.308593725 0.04122619 0.280525775
2002 0.10192566 0.276529869 0.199343122 0.540828754
2007 0.39638552 0.360356203 0.704658745 0.640609051
2013 0.26772699 0.704780724 0.104051101 0.273910412
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Secondly, there have been changes in the labour market structure. Migrant workers
have been the main body of urban China’s labour supply5 until Min Gong Huang
(severe shortage of migrant workers) emerged in 2004, which spread from coastal
regions to inland, from manufacturing to service industries, and from female workers’
shortage to overall shortage in 2010 (Li & Tian, 2011). Min Gong Huang signalled
that the era of limitless supply of labour in China had come to an end (Wang, Cai, &
Gao, 2005). It also meant an increase in the elasticity of labour supply and a decline
of the monopoly in urban China’s labour market. Both these factors, particularly
shortage of supply of female workers, not only put pressure on employers to raise
female workers’ wages but also significantly weakened employer discrimination (Barth
& Dale-Olsen, 2009), thereby narrowing the gender wage gap.
Driven by the optimisation of female workers’ endowments, the execution of new
labour market legislation, the transformation of labour supply from limitless supply
to shortage, as well as the reform of income distribution policies, a long-term trend
of convergence in both gender wage gap and discrimination has been forming. 2007
marked the beginning of the advancement of China into a society exhibiting more
equity and justice.
7. Conclusion
Using four cross-sectional data from CHIPS 1995, 2002, 2007 and 2013, we explored
the changing causes and trends of the gender wage gap and discrimination in urban
China’s labour market employing Neumark and Appleton decomposition method-
ology. We found that ‹ from the mid-1990s to 2007 the gender wage gap and dis-
crimination against women in urban China’s labour market witnessed a divergence,
and a convergence thereafter; › the contribution of the endowment difference to
gender wage gap is getting smaller and smaller because women have been steadily
optimising human capital and job characteristics; and the contribution of discrimin-
ation is getting larger and larger, eventually exceeding that of endowment difference
and becoming the main contributor to the gender wage gap after 2002; fi after 2007,
both gender wage gap and discrimination against women began to converge, and
employment discrimination began to decrease and dropped lower than wage discrim-
ination. The convergence of both gender wage gap and discrimination are results of a
combination of factors, including improvement in women’s endowments, enactment
of the New Labour Contract Act, transition of the labour market structure, and
reform of the income distribution policies. We may assert that the convergence is a
long term trend, indicating 2007 as the threshold from which China is stepping for-
ward into a more equal and just society.
This study reports the causes and long-term trends of gender wage gap and dis-
crimination in China’s urban labour market. We have managed to overcome the flaws
of sample selection bias and dual index number problems that existed in previous
research studies. However, we have not analysed changing patterns of the wage differ-
entials in different wage distributions, which may be more important to policy mak-
ers. The magnitudes, trends, and causes of change in gender wage gap observed using
mean decomposition are relatively different from those observed using quantile
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decomposition. A quantile analysis would, therefore, be worthwhile. In addition, the
effects of industrial segregation, occupational segregation, and regional segregation on
gender wage gap would also be invaluable inquiries in this field.
Notes
1. Labor and Social Security Statistical Bulletin 1997–2000, http://www.mohrss.gov.cn/
SYrlzyhshbzb/zwgk/szrs/
2. Cai, Zhang, The Green Book on Population and Labor, A Report of China’s Population
and Labor, No. 17, http://www.ssap.com.cn/c/2016-12-01/1044731.shtml
3. Due to limited space, we have not presented the results of regression for data in 1995,
2002 and 2013 and of their decomposition. Feel free to contact the authors should you
have any need.
4. To avoid the potential increase in costs incurred by the New Labor Contract Act, many
companies asked to renew the contract with their employees. In the beginning of 2008,
7,000 Huawei employees, including the CEO Ren Zhengfei ‘resigned’, NetEst, http://news.
163.com/07/1027/00/3RP827DF0001124J.html
5. There were 25.278 million migrant workers in 2011 accounting for 70.38% of urban
China’s labour market, 26.261 million accounting for 70.78% in 2012, 26.894 million
accounting for 70.32% in 2013, and 27.395 million accounting for 71.64% in 2014.
Statistical Bulletin on Human Resource and Social Security 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, http://
www.mohrss.gov.cn/SYrlzyhshbzb/zwgk/szrs/
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